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UNCERTAINTY ABOUT REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST AND
PRIVITY IN AIA TRIALS
EVAN DAY, KEVIN PATARIU & BING AI
Since the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) created administrative trial proceedings (“AIA trials”) at the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board (PTAB) of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the PTAB has been
one of the busiest patent litigation venues in the U.S. with nearly eight thousand petitions for AIA trials filed so far.1 Congress imposes strict limits on
the use of AIA trials to further the goal of providing a “cost effective alternative to formal litigation”2 while reducing “the ability to use post-grant procedures for abusive serial challenges to patents.”3 To achieve such goals, the
AIA limits certain actions that can be taken by a petitioner, a real party in
interest (RPI) or party in privity with the petitioner. Under 35 U.S.C.
§ 315(b), a party sued for patent infringement may not file a petition for IPR
of a patent more than one year after service of the complaint, and this time
bar also applies to an RPI or party in privity with the petitioner.4 In addition,
the AIA’s estoppel provisions limit the ability of the petitioner, an RPI or
privy of the petitioner, to raise certain invalidity issues in another AIA trial
before the PTAB or a proceeding before a district court and the International
Trade Commission (ITC).5 Notably, AIA trials may impact district court patent litigation through stays of litigation, dismissal of asserted claims found
 Perkins Coie LLP, 11988 El Camino Real, Suite 350, San Diego, CA 92130. The authors wish to thank:
the CKJIP staff, for editing and feedback on this article; Meghan Bright, for cite-checking assistance; the
PTAB Bar Association, in particular Christopher Geyer, Joshua Goldberg, and Dan Gjorgiev, for editing
and feedback on drafts of this article; and Amanda Tessar and Elizabeth Banzhoff for their previous
research on this topic which was invaluable during the writing of this article.
1. The Patent Office has been receiving between one hundred and two hundred new petitions for
AIA trials each month in recent years. As of December 31, 2017, a total of 7,930 petitions were filed. See
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRIAL STATISTICS: IPR, PGR, CBM, 3 (2017),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Trial_Statistics_2017-12-31.pdf.
2. 157 CONG. REC. S951 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (Statement of Sen. Hatch).
3. 157 CONG. REC. S952 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (Statement of Sen. Grassley).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (petitioner, RPI, or privy estopped from asserting before Patent Office, in
civil action, or ITC proceeding invalidity grounds that were raised or reasonably could have been raised
during IPR resulting in final written decision) and 325(e) (same for post-grant review). The AIA also
provides a more limited estoppel against a Covered Business Method petitioner in district court and ITC
proceedings. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284. §§
18(a)(1)(D),18(a)(1)(A).
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unpatentable by the PTAB, estoppel against defendants raising certain invalidity grounds after PTAB final written decisions, and more.6 Accordingly,
properly identifying an RPI or privy of the petitioner is important to parties
on both sides of a proceeding before the PTAB, a district court or the ITC.
Uncertainty over the meaning and scope of the “real party in interest”
or “party in privity” has led to frequent disputes, particularly where the party
filing an IPR has some relationship to a party sued in a related lawsuit.7
While the law regarding this issue has so far developed, in the main, through
non-precedential decisions by individual PTAB panels, the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit recently decided en banc that it had jurisdiction to
review the issue.8 As a result, patent practitioners should expect more clarity,
or at least more binding precedent, as to when a defendant in an infringement
lawsuit is an RPI or in privity with the petitioner in an AIA trial.9
The AIA requires a petition for an AIA trial to identify “all real parties
in interest”10 and to certify that the petitioner is not barred or estopped from
filing the petition due to any RPI or privity relationship.11 Such requirements
assist the PTAB in identifying conflicts and ensures proper application of
estoppel provisions precluding an RPI or privy from making invalidity arguments to the PTAB.12 The PTAB has said, in a precedential decision, that the
statutory requirement to name real parties in interest is not jurisdictional,
and, therefore, the PTAB has discretion to allow parties to correct defects in
the identification of RPIs without changing the filing date.13 However, if the
6. Michael O. Warnecke, Interactions between PTAB Proceedings and Civil Actions, in ANATOMY
177–86 (Harry J. Roper, et al., eds., 3d ed. 2017).
7. See generally Amanda Tessar, et al., Best practices for IPR proceedings and real party in interest, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW (June 12, 2016), https://www.worldipreview.com/article/best-practices-for-ipr-proceedings-and-real-party-in-interest [hereinafter Best Practices]; Amanda
Tessar, et al., Real Parties In Interest: Proceed With Caution, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW
(Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.worldipreview.com/article/real-parties-in-interest-proceed-with-caution
[hereinafter Real Parties].
8. Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
9. On the eve of this publication, the Federal Circuit issued the panel opinion in Wi-Fi One following remand of the case from the en banc court. See Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., No. 15-1944
___ F.3d ___ (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2018). In its newly issued opinion, the court discussed, at length, the
legal standards that the PTAB has to-date applied in its the RPI and privy analyses. The court generally
approved of the PTAB’s legal standards and the application of those standards to the facts of Wi-Fi One.
Thus, there does not appear to be any change in law that should be expected, at least in the short-term,
now that the Federal Circuit is exercising judicial review over this subject matter.
10. 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(2), 322(a)(2).
11. 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(a)(1), (b), (e)(1), 325(e)(1); see also 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.73(d)(1), 42.101,
42.201.
12. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012) (codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
13. Lumentum Holdings, Inc. v. Capella Photonics, Inc., IPR2015-00739, Paper 38 at 4–5
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 4, 2016) (citing Elekta, Inc. v. Varian Med. Sys., Inc., IPR2015-01401, Paper 19 (P.T.A.B.
Dec. 31, 2015)).
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PTAB finds that an unnamed party subject to the § 315(b) time bar is an RPI
or in privity with the petitioner, the PTAB will either decline to institute an
IPR or, if an IPR has already been instituted, terminate the IPR. 14 Additionally, as discussed above, a district court or an ITC administrative law judge
may also need to determine if a party to a civil action or an ITC investigation
is an RPI or privy subject to the estoppel triggered by an AIA trial concluded
with a final written decision.
I.

HOW DOES THE PTAB DEFINE RPI AND PRIVITY?

The AIA generally defines the petitioner to be “a person who is not the
owner of a patent,”15 but is silent on the definition of an RPI and a privy.
Like the courts, the PTAB relies on the common law to supply these definitions. According to PTAB regulations, the RPI under § 315(b) is “the party
that desires review of the patent,” which may be the petitioner itself or “the
party or parties at whose behest the petition has been filed.”16 The statutory
bar of § 315(b) “is analogous to the common-law doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which ‘preclude parties from contesting matters
that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate . . . .’”17 Therefore,
the PTAB will “look[] to these doctrines of preclusion in interpreting the
language of §315(b).”18
The PTAB’s Office Patent Trial Practice Guide explains that whether a
party not named in a petition nonetheless constitutes an RPI or is privy to
that proceeding is a “highly fact-dependent question[]” that “will be handled
by the Office on a case-by-case basis,” based on the framework set forth by
the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Sturgell.19 In Taylor, the Court, although acknowledging that it was not establishing a “definitive taxonomy,” identified
the following factors as relevant to the question of whether a third party is a
privy:
1. Whether the third party agrees to be bound by the determination of issues in the proceeding;
14. See, e.g., Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC v. PPC Broadband, Inc., IPR2014-00440, Paper
68 at 26 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 18, 2015); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Bennett Regulator Guards, Inc., IPR201300453, Paper 88 at 17 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 6, 2015).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012).
16. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012).
17. Aruze Gaming Macau, Ltd. v. MGT Gaming, Inc., IPR2014-01288, Paper 13 at 7–8 (P.T.A.B.
Feb. 20, 2015) (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979)).
18. Id. at 7.
19. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012) (citing Taylor
v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008)).
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2. Whether a pre-existing substantive legal relationship
with the party named in the proceeding justifies binding
the third party;
3. Whether, “in certain limited circumstances”, the third
party is adequately represented by someone with the
same interests;
4. Whether the third party exercised or could have exercised control over the proceeding;
5. Whether the third party is bound by a prior decision and
is attempting to rehear the matter through a proxy; and
6. Whether a statutory scheme forecloses successive hearing by third parties.20
The PTAB frequently focuses on the fourth factor (control) as all but
determinative.21 The PTAB has explained that the “central” factor to its determination is whether “a party other than the named petitioner was controlling, or capable of controlling, the proceeding before the Board.”22 A party
need not exercise complete control of a proceeding to be considered an RPI;
the degree of control (or funding) requires “consideration of the pertinent
facts.”23 The PTAB’s regulations explain that “it should be enough that the
nonparty has the actual measure of control or opportunity to control that
might reasonably be expected between two formal co-parties.”24 In other
words, the PTAB inquires “whether someone other than the named petitioner
is litigating through a proxy.”25
While RPI and privity issues are often discussed together and frequently
overlap, even in PTAB regulations and cases, they are not the same. Privity
is a more “expansive” concept, “encompassing parties that do not necessarily
need to be identified in the petition” as an RPI. 26 The PTAB has explained
that while the RPI inquiry “focuses on a party’s relationship to a proceeding,

20. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008).
21. See, e.g., Aruze Gaming, IPR2014-01288, Paper 13 at 11; Zoll Lifecor Corp. v. Phillips Elecs.
N. Am. Corp., IPR2013-00609, Paper 15 at 10–11, 14–15 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2014); Atlanta Gas Light
Co. v. Bennett Regulator Guards, Inc., IPR2013-00453, Paper 88 at 9 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 6, 2015).
22. Aruze Gaming, IPR2014-01288, Paper 13 at 11.
23. Id. at 11 (quoting Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012)).
24. Id. at 12 (quoting Office Patent Trial Practice Guide Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012)).
25. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
26. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012).
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the privity inquiry focuses on the relationship between parties.”27 For example, two parties may be in privity of contract with respect to a product accused of infringement.28
When privity issues arise in the context of § 315(b)’s time bar, the
PTAB considers whether the “relationship between the party to be estopped
and the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation . . . is sufficiently close so
as to justify application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.”29 Accordingly,
PTAB decisions discussing privity have typically looked at the relationship
between the petitioner and the alleged privy of the petitioner at the time the
latter was served with a complaint for infringement.30 Therefore, as a practical matter, while RPI and privity issues tend to overlap, the PTAB will look
at the relationship between parties in regard to the filing of the petition for
IPR itself to determine whether a third party is an RPI, and the relationship
between parties in regard to prior litigation to determine whether a third party
is a privy.
II.

TYPES OF RELATIONSHIPS CAUSING RPI AND PRIVITY
DISPUTES

The most common scenarios in which the PTAB has addressed RPI and
privity issues include (1) co-defendants in litigation, (2) patent defense organizations, (3) corporate relationships, and (4) customer/supplier or indemnitor/indemnitee relationships.31 The Office Patent Trial Practice Guide itself
cautions that participation in a joint defense group does not create an RPI or
privity relationship,32 and PTAB decisions have generally found that a codefendant is not an RPI or privy absent a specific connection to the petition

27. Aruze Gaming, IPR2014-01288, Paper 13 at 13 (emphasis in original) (citing Int’l Nutrition
Co. v. Horphag Research, Ltd., 220 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
28. Id. at 13-14 (citing In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochlorine Extended-Release Capsule Patent
Litig., 504 F. App’x 900, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
29. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012) (emphasis
added), (quoting 154 CONG. REC. S9987 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (internal citations omitted)).
30. See, e.g., Arris Grp., Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC, IPR2014-00746, Paper 22 at 9 (P.T.A.B.
Nov. 24, 2014) (“Patent Owner does not provide evidence sufficient to demonstrate that, at the time of
service of the 2011 complaint . . . . Petitioner exercised control or could have exercised control over [alleged privy]’s participation in the 2011 district court proceeding”) (emphasis added); Aruze Gaming,
IPR2014-01288, Paper 13 at 15–16 (PTAB cases “focus on the relationship between the parties in the
context of the prior lawsuit”) (emphasis added).
31. See Best Practices, supra note 7.
32. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012).
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at issue.33 As for participation in patent defense organizations, merely funding such organizations does not make a party an RPI;34 however, the PTAB
has also found that a time-barred litigation defendant, whose arrangements
with a patent defense organization gave them the ability to suggest patents
to challenge, was an undisclosed RPI to a petition brought by the organization.35
Corporate affiliations create a more complicated situation, with inconsistent results from the PTAB. Common ownership or corporate officers between related entities does not necessarily create privity or an RPI relationship, absent evidence that the corporate form has been ignored.36 The use of
common counsel between related entities also does not automatically lead to
the conclusion that a corporate affiliate of petitioner was an RPI or in privity.37 However, in other cases, the use of common in-house and outside counsel, as well as overlapping corporate officers, has led the PTAB to conclude
that lines of corporate separation were sufficiently blurred that related corporate entities should be considered RPIs.38 Additionally, the PTAB may
rely on the involvement of a related company or its officers in licensing or
settlement discussions as indicative of an RPI relationship.39 Within the
multi-factor legal framework under Taylor, the PTAB’s case-by-case approach has generated divergent and fact-specific PTAB panel opinions about
related companies, making it difficult for litigants to predict the result in any
particular case involving corporate affiliations.

33. See, e.g., Weatherford Int’l, LLC v. Packers Plus Energy Servs., Inc., IPR2016-01517, Paper
23 at 11–15 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2017); Syntroleum Corp. v. Neste Oil Oyj, IPR2013-00178, Paper 22 at
7 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 4, 2013); Denso Corp. v. Beacon Navigation GmbH, IPR2013-00026, Paper 34 at 10–
11 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 14, 2014).
34. See, e.g., Unified Patents Inc. v. Plectrum LLC, IPR2017-01430, Paper 8 at 8–10 (P.T.A.B.
Nov. 14, 2017).
35. RPX Corp. v. VirnetX, Inc., IPR2014-00171, Paper 49 (P.T.A.B. June 5, 2014) (public redacted
version available as Paper 57, July 14, 2014).
36. Aruze Gaming Macau, Ltd. v. MGT Gaming, Inc., IPR2014-01288, Paper 13 at 19 (P.T.A.B.
Feb. 20, 2015) (citing Gillig v. Nike, Inc., 602 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010)); LG Display Co., Ltd.
v. Innovative Display Techs. LLC, IPR2014-01362, Paper 12 at 5–6 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 2, 2015); TRW Auto.
U.S. LLC v. Magna Elecs. Inc., IPR2014-01351, Paper 7 at 5–8 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 10, 2015).
37. Aruze Gaming, IPR2014-01288, Paper 13 at 20.
38. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC v. PPC Broadband, Inc., IPR2014-00440, Paper 68 at 19
(P.T.A.B. Aug. 18, 2015); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Bennett Regulator Guards, Inc., IPR2013-00453,
Paper 88 at 17 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 6, 2015).
39. Paramount Home Entm’t Inc. v. Nissim Corp., IPR2014-00961, Paper 11 at 8–9 (P.T.A.B. Dec.
29, 2014); Zoll Lifecor Corp. v. Phillips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., IPR2013-00609, Paper 15 at 9–10 (P.T.A.B.
Mar. 20, 2014).
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Finally, customer/supplier and indemnity relationships generally are insufficient to show an RPI or privity relationship,40 unless the evidence shows
that the indemnitor pays for and controls the IPR.41
III.

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT STEPS IN

Although the case-by-case determinations of RPI and privity issues by
separate PTAB panels have led to unpredictability for PTAB practitioners
and their clients, the Federal Circuit had, until recently, held that it could not
review such issues.42 The critical question was the interpretation of 35 U.S.C.
§ 315(d), which states that “[t]he determination by the Director [of the
USPTO] whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall
be final and nonappealable.”43 In Achates Reference Publishing, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that § 315(d) “prohibits this court from
reviewing the Board’s decision to initiate IPR proceedings based on its assessment of the time-bar of § 315(b),” and therefore refused to consider the
Patent Owner’s argument that the petitioner (Apple) should have been timebarred due to earlier lawsuits against developers who made apps for Apple
products.44 The panel held that the words “under this section” in § 315(d)
modified the word “institute” and therefore specifically prohibited the Federal Circuit from reviewing the PTAB’s decision that the petition was not
time-barred.45
Achates left RPI and privity issues unreviewable by the Federal Circuit,
and therefore the exclusive province of the PTAB, until the Federal Circuit
revisited its interpretation of the statute. In Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom
Corp., the petitioner filed an IPR several years after the patent owner had
filed lawsuits against multiple defendants, alleging that transceivers in the
defendants’ products made by the petitioner infringed a patent.46 After the
PTAB invalidated the patent, the patent owner argued on appeal that the petition should have been time-barred because of the relationship between the
petitioner and the prior defendants.47 In a divided opinion, a majority of the

40. See, e.g., Nissan N. Am., Inc. v. Diamond Coating Tech., LLC, IPR2014-01546, Paper 22,
(P.T.A.B. Apr. 28, 2015); Petroleum Geo-Servs. Inc. v. WesternGeco LLC, IPR2014-00689, Paper 101
at 42-47 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 15, 2015).
41. First Data Corp. v. Cardsoft, LLC, IPR2014-00715, Paper 9 at 7–8 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 17, 2014).
42. Achates Reference Publ’g, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 803 F.3d 652, 658 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
43. Id. at 655, 658.
44. Id. at 653–54, 658.
45. Id. at 658.
46. 837 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
47. Id.
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Federal Circuit panel followed Achates and held that § 314(d) prohibited appellate review of the Board’s assessment of the § 315(b) time bar.48
However, the Federal Circuit granted en banc review and overruled
Achates.49 The majority applied a “strong presumption” favoring judicial review of agency actions.50 In view of that presumption, the majority narrowly
interpreted the § 314(d) restriction on judicial review to preclude only review
of the “threshold” determination under § 314(a), which requires the PTAB
to determine whether the petition had shown a “reasonable likelihood” of
prevailing with respect to at least one challenged patent claim.51 Because the
question of whether a petition is timely filed under § 315(b) is unrelated to
that preliminary determination, even though it is decided in the decision to
institute, and is a “condition precedent” to the PTAB’s statutory authority to
act, the majority ruled that judicial review of timeliness under § 315(b) was
not precluded by § 314(d).52 However, the en banc court did not address the
merits of Wi-Fi One’s time bar, remanding the issue instead to the merits
panel.53
IV.

UNRESOLVED ISSUES

Many issues remain unresolved following the Wi-Fi One en banc decision. Although it is clear after Wi-Fi One that patent owners may appeal adverse time bar decisions, the Federal Circuit will need to resolve whether
petitioners may file such appeals.54 The AIA allows any party dissatisfied
with a final written decision in an IPR to appeal.55 However, PTAB rulings
against petitioners over RPI and privity issues typically occur in denials of
institution56 or, if an IPR has already been instituted, in a decision to dismiss
or terminate the IPR,57 rather than in a final written decision. Petitioners who
have not been sued or otherwise directly accused of infringement may also
have difficulty establishing Article III standing to appeal an adverse decision

48. Id. at 1333.
49. Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1371–75 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
50. Id. at 1372 (citing Cuozzo Speech Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016).
51. Id. at 1372–73.
52. Id. at 1373–75.
53. Id. at 1375.
54. As mentioned, the appellant in Wi-Fi One was the patent owner, after a final written decision.
55. 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012).
56. See, e.g., Zoll Lifecor Corp. v. Phillips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., IPR2013-00609, Paper 15 at 16–
7 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2014).
57. See, e.g., Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Bennett Regulator Guards, Inc., IPR2013-00453, Paper 88
at 17 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 6, 2015) (terminating IPR and vacating Decision to Institute).
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on RPI or privity grounds.58 In some scenarios (such as petitions by patent
defense organizations), the petitioner itself may lack standing to appeal even
if another party that would have such standing (e.g., an accused infringer in
a patent lawsuit) was found to be an RPI. Wi-Fi One’s remand panel further
needs to determine the standard it will apply to RPI and privity questions,
particularly when the § 315(b) time bar is implicated. Although one judge on
the original panel was prepared to find that the petitioner was neither in privity with the defendants in the civil case nor an RPI in that case, the concurrence did not discuss the standard applied to reach that conclusion.59 The
Federal Circuit may also decide whether it will defer to the PTO’s interpretation of the terms “real party in interest” and “privity” under Chevron.60 If
it does apply such deference, the PTO’s guidance in the Office Patent Trial
Practice Guide will continue to provide the controlling framework for RPI
and privity decisions, although it is likely that future Federal Circuit decisions will provide additional guidance in specific factual situations.

58. See, e.g., Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1262–63 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
59. Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 837 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Reyna, J., concurring).
60. See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).

